Names of God: Attributes of Divine Nature In Maimonides' Jewish Philosophy

December 7, 2003
By Jim Weller

Just what is God, after all? What can we say about God to represent an apprehension of divine nature? What can we know of God qua God, as distinguished from our knowledge of God’s effects – what the ancient philosophers called the “sensible” and the “intelligible” aspects of reality? What in the world can we attribute to God’s essence – what God is, in the way that we give “names,” or attributive terms, to signify what an existing thing essentially is? These are some of the puzzling questions the medieval philosophers of theology asked themselves. Our contemporaries are still asking them. The questions asked in terms of any other object of knowledge, or philosophical apprehension, remain, when asked of God (in an oft-used phrase), “an enigma inside a puzzle wrapped in a mystery.”

I know no better way of answering than this: All we can truly say, or know, or understand concerning what God is, is that God is. That is just how God answers the Biblical Moses’ question asking God’s name: Eyeh-Asher-Eyeh – “I am that I am.” These are the words of the oldest text in the Hebrew Scriptures, dating from around 950 BCE. In other words, God’s essence and existence are one. As St. Thomas Aquinas put it, according to University of Notre Dame professor of theology and philosophy David B. Burrell, Deus est esse – God is “to-be,” in the infinitive, i.e., “existence,” or “being.” Alternatively, as in Paul Tillich’s twentieth-century formulation of the Biblical answer, God is “Being-itself.” Tillich finds that the basis – what he calls the "prius" – of all philosophy of religion, as affirmed by St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, is the Deus est esse. God is being, a unity of essence and existence.

Just so, for Moses Maimonides, writing in his twelfth-century didactic on the meaning of Torah and Talmud, The Guide of the Perplexed, nothing that can be said of the human experience of reality can be properly said of God as God, “there being nothing in what exists besides God . . . and the totality of the things He has made. There is, moreover, no way to apprehend Him except it be through the things He has made; for they are indicative of his existence and of what ought to be believed about Him, I mean to say, of what should be affirmed and denied with regard to Him.”

Maimonides’ doctrine is that we can only speak of God’s attributes, or “names,” by analogy, as though, like anything in existence, something might be predicated of it – what its formal features, or substantial properties or qualities are, or even what it is, essentially, its “quiddity.” Because, unlike something in existence that can be made the object of thought, God is existence essentially.

Maimonides enunciated the public doctrine that he maintained ought to be believed by the multitudes “on traditional authority,” as follows: “that God is not a body; that there is absolutely no likeness in any respect whatsoever between Him and the things created by Him; [and] that His existence has no likeness to theirs.” He explained further, concerning the Names of God,

"Everything that can be ascribed to God . . . differs in every respect from our attributes, so that no definition can comprehend the one thing and the other. Similarly, the term ‘existence’ can only be applied equivocally [differently] to His existence and to that of things other than Him. As for the discussion concerning attributes and the way they should be negated with regard to Him; and as to the meaning of the attributes that may be ascribed to Him . . . and the notion of His names, though they are many, being indicative of one and the same thing – it should be considered that all of these are obscure matters. In fact, they are truly the mysteries of the Torah and the secrets [of the Talmud.]"

Therefore, in a declaration of the absolute limits to human understanding given as a preface to his discussion of the knowable aspects of God, Maimonides warned against intellectual hubris, writing,

"Know that the human intellect has objects of apprehension that it is within its power and according to its nature to apprehend. On the other hand, in the totality of that which exists, there also are existents and matters that . . . [the human intellect] is not capable of apprehending in any way; the gates of . . . apprehension are shut before it. There are also in that which exist things of which the intellect may apprehend one state while not being cognizant of other states. The fact that it apprehends does not entail the conclusion that it can apprehend all things."

Maimonides emphasized that the incomprehensibility of divine or metaphysical realities (he equates the two adjectives), “for the apprehension of which [humankind] . . . has a great longing,” has been recognized by philosophers of all times and cultures, and this is not “a statement made [just] in order to conform to Law [Torah].” He recounts the Greek philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias’ dictum that there are three causes of differences of human opinion concerning speculative truth, one of which is plain ignorance. The others are human contentiousness, and “the obscurity of the object of apprehension in itself and the difficulty of apprehending it” – the ultimate incomprehensibility just mentioned. To these, Maimonides adds another cause of perplexity. “It is habit and upbringing. For [humankind] has in his nature a love of, and an inclination for, that to which he is habituated.” By this, he means the mistake of flat, literal interpretation of the sacred texts, “whose external meaning is indicative of the corporeality of God and other imaginings with no truth in them, for these have been set forth as parables and riddles.”

Because of the fundamentally incomprehensible Eyeh-Asher-Eyeh, there is profound virtue and sense in the Holy Scriptures’ use of parabolic and metaphoric language, “in such a manner as the mind is led toward the existence of the objects of these opinions and representations but not toward grasping their essence as it truly is.” The central enigma must be approached only with the utmost circumspection, awe, and humility. It is “beyond the domain of things that [humankind] is able to grasp,” and yet it is the truth of ultimate reality. In this regard, Maimonides teaches by allusion to Proverbs 25:16, rendering: “Hast thou found honey? Eat [only] so much as is sufficient for thee, lest thou be filled therewith and vomit it.”

As for the Names of God and the other “mysteries of the Torah,” Maimonides explained, “When people have received this doctrine [of the incorporeality and unity of God], are habituated to and educated and grown up in it, and subsequently become perplexed . . . they should be elevated to the knowledge of the interpretation of [the books of the prophets], and their attention should be drawn to the equivocality and figurative sense of the various terms.”

Thus, Maimonides explains at length, every affect, act, feature, and quality ascribed to God is meant in figuratively humanistic terms. Citing the Babylonian Talmud, he reminds the reader, “The Torah speaketh in the language of the sons of man.” He asserts thus that scripture attributing to God such human affects as wrath, anger, and jealousy express the attitudes of the faithful toward idolaters and infidels, the willfully ignorant and blasphemous people of the society amongst whom they lived and worshipped. Anthropomorphisms in scripture, i.e., terms used of God such as “face,” “back,” “heart,” “air [breath],” “soul,” “living,” “wing,” “eye [or sight, seeing],” and “hear [hearing],” are in each instance “an equivocal term, its equivocality being mostly with respect to its figurative use.” Furthermore, he avers, “When we . . . begin to expound the negation of the attributes, we shall make clear how all this is reducible to one notion, which is exclusively that of the essence of God . . . who produces everything other than He, and in addition apprehends His own act.” Maimonides presages for his reader, “When . . . the true reality is investigated it will be found . . . that He has no essential attribute existing in true reality, such as would be superadded to his essence [esse].” Then, he gives his well-known expostulation of antitheses concerning the divine essence:

"On the attributes . . . it is known that existence . . . is superadded to the quiddity [essence] of what exists. This is clear and necessary with regard to everything the existence of which has a cause. As for that which has no cause for its existence, there is only God. For this is the meaning of our saying . . . that His existence is necessary. Accordingly, His existence is identical with His essence and his true reality, and His essence is His existence. He exists, but not through an existence other than His essence; . . . He lives, but not through life; . . . He is powerful, but not through power; . . . He knows, but not through knowledge. He is one not through oneness."

Regarding these, Maimonides’ famous “negative attributions,” the fundamentals are the dogmatic attributions he prescribes, of the in-corporeality and un-likeness of God to any other existent. These negations derive from the primal credos of Jew, Muslim, and Christian: “Hear, O Israel, God our God is one;” “There is no God but Allah;” and “I believe in one God.” Thus, his summary teaching is the admonition to “Know that the description of God by means of negations is the correct description – negations are in a certain respect attributes and . . . we have no way of describing Him unless it be through negations and not otherwise.”

The sole affirmative attribution proper to God, according to Maimonides’ treatise, is the one I began with here. Maimonides makes of this a demonstration founded in the scriptural revelation “made known to Moses and through which they [the Israelites] would acquire a true notion of the existence of God, this knowledge being: I am that I am.”

"This is a name deriving from the verb to be, which signifies existence. The whole secret consists in the repetition in a predicative position of the very word indicative of existence. For the word that requires the mention of an attribute immediately connected with it. Accordingly, the first word is I am, considered as a term to which a predicate is attached; the second word that is predicated of the first is also I am, that is, identical with the first. Scripture makes, as it were, a clear statement . . . that He is existent not through existence . . . [i.e.] the existent that is the existent, or the necessarily existent. This is what demonstration necessarily leads to, namely, to the view that there is a necessarily existent thing that has never been, or ever will be, nonexistent.”

Maimonides has a very great deal more to say to the perplexed reader concerning his “divine science.” For myself though, dear reader, I say at this juncture, “Further, plaintiff alleges not,” as it were in a legal complaint; or – not to put too fine a point on it – in the words of the Biblical sage Qoholeth, “God is in heaven and you are on earth; that is why your words should be few.”